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Sat Aug 28 17:24:55 CEST 2010

nditional integrity=2C or unconditional<br>&gt=3B &gt=3B privacy. When ever=
y component is compromised=2C only<br>&gt=3B &gt=3B one of those two proper=
ties can be preserved. In this<br>&gt=3B &gt=3B work=2C we hold the opinion=
 that the more important prop-<br>&gt=3B &gt=3B erty=2C the one that gets p=
eople=92s attention when they under-<br>&gt=3B &gt=3B stand open-audit voti=
ng=2C is unconditional integrity: even<br>&gt=3B &gt=3B if all election adm=
inistrators are corrupt=2C they cannot con-<br>&gt=3B &gt=3B vincingly fake=
 a tally. With this design decision made=2C<br>&gt=3B &gt=3B privacy is the=
n ensured by recruiting enough trustees and<br>&gt=3B &gt=3B hoping that a =
minimal subset of them will remain honest."<br>&gt=3B &gt=3B<br>&gt=3B &gt=
=3B All the online voting systems that work (like the debian voting system)=
<br>&gt=3B &gt=3B completely drop the privacy exigence in order to have abs=
olute vote<br>&gt=3B &gt=3B integrity and no trust given on third parties. =
I think that this question is<br>&gt=3B &gt=3B serious enough to be conside=
red.<br>&gt=3B <br>&gt=3B <br>&gt=3B I know that=2C I've been studying this=
 topic for a while. There is no<br>&gt=3B way you can have both things at t=
he same time. In current voting<br>&gt=3B system=2C you have to also trust =
the voting system integrity (watch the<br>&gt=3B TED talk referred by Rodri=
go in this thread). The good thing about the<br>&gt=3B kind of cryptographi=
c systems like the one used in Helios Voting is<br>&gt=3B that you can have=
 with reasonably good expectations both things=2C<br>&gt=3B because you set=
up a wide list of election administrators that would<br>&gt=3B need all to =
be corrupt for decrypting a single vote.<br>&gt=3B <br>&gt=3B &gt=3B And I =
am not even talking about deniability (the fact that you could be<br>&gt=3B=
 &gt=3B threatened into revealing your encryption keys in order to check th=
at you<br>&gt=3B &gt=3B voted "correctly")<br>&gt=3B &gt=3B<br>&gt=3B &gt=
=3B If you want a trustable e-voting system=2C you have to either propose a=
 way to<br>&gt=3B &gt=3B create a third-party that every voter can trust=2C=
 or you have to convince<br>&gt=3B &gt=3B voters that privacy of vote is no=
t necessary. I mean=2C that is possible.<br>&gt=3B &gt=3B Deputies and sena=
tors don't have secrecy of vote=2C in some swiss cities they<br>&gt=3B &gt=
=3B use hand-voting=2C and signing a petition is the opposite of secret vot=
ing.<br>&gt=3B &gt=3B That is a defensible point of view but you have to ma=
ke it clear from the<br>&gt=3B &gt=3B start.<br>&gt=3B <br>&gt=3B OR you ha=
ve a wide range of third parties with different interests<br>&gt=3B that no=
 one will think that they will be able to all agree to corrupt<br>&gt=3B a =
voting together. Different organizations and political parties<br>&gt=3B wo=
rking together. This would be like voting observers=2C but they do not<br>&=
gt=3B only observe but participate in the anonimization process of the<br>&=
gt=3B mixnet based voting system.<br>&gt=3B <br>&gt=3B &gt=3B&gt=3B If we w=
ant to have a better control of the<br>&gt=3B &gt=3B&gt=3B voting environme=
nt we could for example only allow voting in computers<br>&gt=3B &gt=3B&gt=
=3B specially set up in Partido de Internet's local offices and using a<br>=
&gt=3B &gt=3B&gt=3B secure GNU/Linux live cd created for this purpose.<br>&=
gt=3B &gt=3B<br>&gt=3B &gt=3B But people would have to trust Partido de Int=
ernet for not installing<br>&gt=3B &gt=3B fraudulent software. Why would th=
ey trust it ?<br>&gt=3B <br>&gt=3B The livecd wouldbe 100% free software. C=
heck the software source code<br>&gt=3B if you want. Then bring your own CD=
=2C we do a check sum or similar to<br>&gt=3B be sure that CD is correct=2C=
 then you can use it.<br>&gt=3B <br>&gt=3B Regards=2C<br>&gt=3B      Eduard=
o.<br>&gt=3B ____________________________________________________<br>&gt=3B=
 Pirate Parties International - General Talk<br>&gt=3B
eral at<br>&gt=3B
nfo/<br> 		 	   		  </body>


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