[pp.int.general] Tor Fork / Rotor on community radio

[carlo von lynX]

On Tue, Aug 30, 2016 at 09:21:15PM +0200, Jelena Jovanovic wrote:
> Definitely if you have time give it a listen. :D
> 
> https://www.spreaker.com/embed/player/standard?autoplay=true&user_id=5292381#

ERROR: Unsupported URL: https://www.spreaker.com/embed/player/standard?autoplay=true&user_id=5292381

My thoughts on Tor: We know that the main problems of the Tor
technology lie in its architecture, so forking is not a solution.
The problems aren't easily fixable, it makes more sense to redo
the service on a different architecture. I have elaborated a lot
on the details in http://secushare.cheettyiapsyciew.onion/anonymity.

A reason to fork Tor would be, if the group of friends running the
directory servers are also to be considered no longer trustworthy.
AFAIK they were however not involved with recent developments and
Tor Project Inc has not dared to replace any directories yet. So
I see no reason to assume Tor to be any more or less secure than
it was before the grand social failure of anarchism.

If the move is actually to be considered a great success for JTRIG,
then disgustedly running away from Tor is just what the attackers
wanted to achieve.

Should Tor Inc indeed dare to replace directory authorities, then
it is in the interest of the majority of relay operators to switch
to a new Tor network. Since relay operators are already organized
in a labour union kind of way, it makes sense to welcome them en
bloc when the moment is due. So far they see no reason to switch
since Tor Inc hasn't affected their operations in the least.

I am not aware of any specific issues regarding the Tor router code
nor the Torbrowser codebase. So I don't see a need to fork those.
The disruption of service is the aim of the attackers, not the
actual introduction of malware into the codebase (which they could
just as well try to do with the forked codebase).

Also, Jelena, how can you guarantee that the new owners of the
directory servers will be more trustworthy then the current ones?

In the long run I see more use in having an authority-free onion
routing architecture, and gnunet is a lot closer to achieving that
goal than any Tor fork could be. So if you *really* want to move
forward with this, you should help implement BRAHMS and onion
routing in gnunet. That would really bring us to a new dimension
of quality regarding anonymity on the Internet.

https://phab.rotorproject.org/w/software_design_and_architecture/
tells me that the aim is to also support I2P and Freenet. I2P
suffers from similar attack scenarios as Tor while Freenet isn't
even suitable for surfing the web.

The mailing list archives are no longer public, so I can't dig
deeper. Maybe you can tell me things I missed.


-- 
  E-mail is public! Talk to me in private using encryption:
         http://loupsycedyglgamf.onion/LynX/
          irc://loupsycedyglgamf.onion:67/lynX
         https://psyced.org:34443/LynX/