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the cool and nice to have feature about the system in the video i sent<br>was that later you could check online your vote, see if it was counted <br>right and have a crypto-signed prof if not.<br>all e-voting systems to the date have failed because they assume, this<br>you can't break, and when someone does there's no backup plan.-<br><br>-r<br>> From: edulix@gmail.com<br>> Date: Wed, 19 Jan 2011 10:55:17 +0100<br>> To: pp.international.general@lists.pirateweb.net<br>> Subject: Re: [pp.int.general] Agora Voting System for a Liquid Democracy at FOSDEM<br>> <br>> On Wed, Jan 19, 2011 at 10:34 AM, Yves Quemener <quemener.yves@free.fr> wrote:<br>> > On 01/19/2011 09:50 AM, Eduardo Robles Elvira wrote:<br>> >><br>> >> Of course we are not going to do that directly: Partido de Internet<br>> >> would need first to have at least one seat at parliament. But when the<br>> >> system is ready and in the mean time, we can start using, testing and<br>> >> improving its security.<br>> ><br>> > As enthusiast as I am about e-democracy, I think this is not the way to go.<br>> > In my humble opinion you start by having a good security and then add some<br>> > features. What is a debatable methodology in regular software development is<br>> > a must-have for this kind of project for a simple reason : you do not want<br>> > fraud, even in the first votes. Especially when you try to convince people<br>> > that this is a viable alternative. Security is not a feature you can patch<br>> > on later. Especially not cryptographic security.<br>> <br>> I agree with you. You start with *very* good security: that is one of<br>> the tenets in our system. This is not to say that you have to always<br>> try to improve the security, which is what I meant.<br>> <br>> >> There are cryptographic voting<br>> >> protocols that even if all election administrators are corrupt, they<br>> >> cannot convincingly fake a tally [1]. These are the kind of systems we<br>> >> are going to use.<br>> ><br>> > Have you seen that in the scenario you propose, they trade privacy for vote<br>> > integrity ? That is currently a big problem in online voting systems and an<br>> > active field of research in cryptography. Currently you have to trade one<br>> > for the other.